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THE PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS IN 
THE HIGH-COST CREDIT SECTOR:  
A MULTIFACETED CHALLENGE 
A KARIM ALDOHNI* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial inclusion, accessible credit and sustainable finance: These terms are 
more than just buzzwords thrown around by international financial organizations 
and politicians who want to be elected or re-elected. They are not abstract terms. 
Rather, they are interconnected concepts with profound social impacts if 
materialized. In fact, these concepts can aid in addressing some of the key 
challenges posed by the high-cost credit market in the United Kingdom. 
However, it is argued in this Article that the United Kingdom has not yet 
managed to take the required steps to advance financial inclusion, accessible 
credit, and sustainable finance in the market. 
For the purpose of this Article, it is important to understand these concepts 
in the context of consumer credit, more specifically high-cost credit. The concept 
of financial inclusion is multidimensional and encompasses an array of elements, 
key among which is the access to financial services, such as savings, credit, and 
insurance, and transactions accounts by those who are disadvantaged.1 Although 
accessible credit is not the only objective on the financial inclusion agenda, it 
remains part and parcel of this agenda. This is because one of the main 
characteristics of those who are financially excluded is the inability to access 
credit.2 
Relatedly, accessible credit means credit that is both available and—more 
importantly—affordable to consumers, with the latter being central to this 
concept. Those who are financially excluded tend to be in the lowest income 
brackets,3 which restricts their access to mainstream credit even though they may 
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 1.  See Financial Inclusion: Overview, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/finan 
cialinclusion/overview [https://perma.cc/577C-BBXF] (“Financial inclusion means that individuals and 
businesses have access to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet their 
needs . . . .”). 
 2.  RESOLUTION FOUND., IN BRIEF: FINANCIAL EXCLUSION 1 (2014), https://www.resolution 
foundation.org/app/uploads/2014/08/Financial-exclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VGL-MB7T]. 
 3.  See STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, WHAT SORT OF CREDIT CAN HELP LOW INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS? 5 (2018), https://www.stepchange.org/Portals/0/documents/Reports/stepchange-debt-ch 
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have transaction accounts. The main reason for this is the institutional assessment 
of their creditworthiness that focuses primarily on their risk of default, or credit 
risk.4 On the face of it, it may seem that those borrowers do not have a credit 
availability problem as they can always resort to the high-cost credit market for 
their borrowing needs. However—as the name suggests—the cost of this type of 
credit is substantially higher than mainstream credit, due to customers’ sub-
optimal credit risk profiles, which further disadvantages those consumers.5 In this 
context, to describe credit as accessible to consumers, borrowers must, at least in 
principle, afford to repay it without adversely impacting their financial position.6 
Addressing financial inclusion and accessibility and affordability of credit is 
not a one-off challenge. There is a need to ensure that the solutions put in place 
to achieve these objectives are sustainable. The term sustainable finance is not 
used in this Article to reflect the sustainable development objectives, where any 
act should equally consider ecological, social, and economic factors, that are 
essential to meet the present and future needs.7 Rather, it is used to denote the 
continuous access to transactional accounts and financial services, particularly 
affordable credit. Regarding the latter, sustainability further concerns the 
continuous review of the suitability of debt and its impact on the borrower’s 
financial position, that is, their ability to continue to repay the debt as it affects 
their ability to pay necessary expenditures. 
As mentioned earlier, this Article primarily focuses on the ’United 
Kingdom’s high-cost credit market. This market doubles as a subprime credit 
market, given that its customers are considered less creditworthy, and therefore 
financially excluded as explained above. The U.K. high-cost credit market offers 
a range of products that attach more weight to creditworthiness than 
affordability. It encompasses: home-collected credit, catalogue credit, 
pawnbroking, logbook loans, and high-cost short-term credit (HCSTC), also 
 
arity-affordable-credit-march-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EYT-9YYR] (stating that households living 
below the poverty line are likely to rely on high-cost credit to finance unexpected costs). 
 4.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR THE FCA REGIME FOR CONSUMER 
CREDIT, 2013, CP13/10, at 66 (UK), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp13-10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97WY-7RY5] (demonstrating more concern with lenders’ ability to seek repayment). 
 5.  For instance, back in 2008, the cost of high-cost short-term credit (such as payday lending) 
reached 4000% APR. Abdul Karim Aldohni, The UK New Regulatory Framework of High-Cost Short-
Term Credit: Is There a Shift Towards a More “Law and Society” Based Approach?, 40 J. CONSUMER 
POL’Y 321, 321 (2017). 
 6.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK: CONSUMER CREDIT SOURCEBOOK, CONC 
5.2A.20R(3-k), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/CONC.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TJA-33WP] 
(“The extent and scope of the creditworthiness assessment, and the steps that the firm must take to satisfy 
the requirement that the assessment is a reasonable one, based on sufficient information, are dependent 
upon, and proportionate to, the individual circumstances of each case.”). 
 7.  See generally, WORLD COMM’N. ON ENV’T AND DEV., REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION 
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987), https://sustainabledevelop 
ment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q873-VGJP] (describing 
the goal of the sustainable development objectives). 
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widely known as payday lending.8 This Article discusses the successive polices 
that have been introduced to govern this segment of the consumer-credit market. 
It also provides an assessment of the extent to which these policies and their 
regulatory implementations have managed to advance financial inclusion and 
affordability and sustainability of credit. In this regard, it argues that the 
challenge posed by the high-cost credit market is multidimensional and that there 
is room for further developments in regulatory response. Part II of the Article 
provides an overview of the high-cost credit market in the United Kingdom Part 
III describes policies implemented by the government to combat issues posed by 
the market. Finally, Part IV details the shortfalls of these policies and provides 
argument for different, potentially more effective approaches. 
II 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.K. HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 
The consumer-credit market in the United Kingdom is diverse. Various 
segments cater to different types of consumers and play a vital role in the lives of 
its ordinary citizens. High-cost credit is an important segment of this market, and 
it provides a lifeline to those who constantly struggle to make ends meet. 
Although the premise of the consumer-credit market is simple, its reality is 
perplexing. In principle, this market should be serving those who are less 
financially able, yet the reality is the more money you own the easier access to 
cheaper credit you have and vice versa. This troubling reality persists in the U.K. 
consumer-credit market generally and in the high-cost credit market more 
specifically, although its governing framework and landscape have changed over 
the centuries. 
As for the governing framework, since the abolition of Usury Laws in 1854, 
the cost of credit gradually but steadily was left entirely for the market to control.9 
The Money Lenders Act 1900—and its amendments by the Money Lenders Act 
1927—introduced a price cap on interest rates (forty-eight percent) above which 
an agreement could be set aside.10 The Act, however, did not automatically set 
aside such an agreement.11 Instead, breach of the statutory interest rate cap only 
raised a presumption of unenforceability. The moneylender could challenge this 
presumption and provide evidence to the contrary before the court.12 
 
 8.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CALL FOR INPUT: HIGH-COST CREDIT INCLUDING REVIEW OF THE 
HIGH-COST SHORT-TERM CREDIT PRICE CAP 8 (Nov. 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/call-for-
input/call-input-high-cost-short-term-credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZV7-XV8W]. 
 9.  See Constant J. Mews & Ibrahim Abraham, Usury and Just Compensation: Religious and 
Financial Ethics in Historical Perspective, 72 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 8 (2007) (discussing how the abolition of 
usury laws led to market deregulation). 
 10.  Abdul Karim Aldohni, Loan Sharks v. Short-term Lenders: How Do the Law and Regulators 
Draw the Line?, 40 J. L. & SOC. 420, 432 (2013). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, REVIEW OF HIGH-COST CREDIT ANNEXE B – PRICE CONTROLS: 
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING PRICE CONTROL AND INTEREST RATE CAPS FOR HIGH-
COST CREDIT, 2010, OFT1232b, at 41, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402161801/ 
http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_credit/High-cost-credit-review/OFT1232b.pdf [https://per 
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The Money Lenders Acts received their fair share of criticism and were found 
deficient by the Crowther Committee Report of 1971,13 and as a result the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA) was introduced.14 However, the CCA only 
further strengthened the market approach to controlling the cost of credit by 
abandoning the statutory ceiling interest rate and providing the court with 
discretionary power to intervene when the credit bargain is deemed 
“extortionate.”15 Even though the CCA factored in the interest rate of the credit 
bargain to decide whether it was extortionate, the Act further reduced 
protections for the financially excluded. By abolishing the statutory cap, the CCA 
clearly acknowledged that the market price of credit is the benchmark in any 
assessment of the credit bargain. Those who resort to high-cost credit usually lack 
access to mainstream credit, which makes their bargaining power in relation to 
the interest rate extremely limited. Additionally, the test set by the CCA used 
vague criteria—setting a “grossly exorbitant” standard and “fair dealing” 
requirement—as a means to protect credit consumers.16 
As a result, the Consumer Credit Act 2006 amended the CCA and replaced 
the “extortionate credit” bargain test with the “unfair relationship” test.17 The 
new test meant to be an improvement from the extortionate credit bargain test. 
However, in reality, the test did not help consumers, especially those parties to 
high-cost credit agreements. The problem with the test lies in the fact that the 
court would always consider the common market price of credit as the reference 
point when the fairness of the credit agreement was challenged on the basis of 
the high interest rate charged.18 In the absence of any regulatory or statutory cap 
on interest rates, and considering the weak bargaining powers of the financially 
excluded, the market rate always favored the high-cost credit providers.19 This 
continued to be the case until 2014. 
With regard to the high-cost credit market landscape, it has continued to 
change since 1850. Back in the second half of the nineteenth century new forms 
of high-cost credit emerged—such as pawnbroking, mail order or catalogue 
 
ma.cc/4HWZ-9ELE] (“[A]greements with rates above 48 per cent per annum were presumed to be 
unconscionable (and thus could be re-opened by the courts), although the presumption could be rebutted 
by the moneylender providing evidence to the contrary.”). 
 13.  See GEOFFREY CROWTHER, CONSUMER CREDIT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 175–81 (1971) 
(highlighting then-present deficiencies in the law related to consumer transactions). 
 14.  Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, §§ 137–40 (UK). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.; see also ELAINE KEMPSON & CLAIRE WHYLEY, PERS. FIN. RSCH. CTR., EXTORTIONATE 
CREDIT IN THE UK: A REPORT TO THE DTI 32 (1999), http://www.bris.ac.uk/geography/research/ 
pfrc/themes/credit-debt/pfrc9903.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7NQ-NBGL] (the Personal Finance Research 
Centre was commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and Industry to undertake this 
research). 
 17.  Consumer Credit Act 2006, c. 14, §§ 19–22 (UK), which inserted §§140A-140C in CCA. 
 18.  See Aldohni, supra note 10, at 441. 
 19.  In a number of cases the court considered the fact that borrowers were in the financially 
excluded group of consumers and would increase the credit risk, hence the high interest rate was 
accepted. For more analysis of these cases, see Aldohni, supra note 10, at 436–41 (analyzing the impact 
of the “unfair relationship test”). 
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credit, hire purchase, credit drapers, and check traders20—with pawnbroking as 
the most prevalent form of high-cost credit.21 However, the twentieth century 
witnessed the decline of pawnbrokers,22 and the re-emergence of other types of 
high-cost credit. For example, credit traders and check traders’ businesses had 
their heyday in the first half of the twentieth century and then went into 
stagnation by the late 1960s.23 In the late 1970s to early 1980s, moneylending, 
more specifically doorstep money lending, became the most prominent form of 
high-cost credit.24 Major credit traders and check traders, such as Provident and 
Cattles, shifted their core business activities into doorstep credit.25 
Moneylending in the twenty-first century continues to be a big business in the 
U.K. high-cost credit market. Further, the 2008 financial crisis played an 
instrumental role in the proliferation of one particular type of high-cost credit: 
payday lending. Payday lending is also known as high-cost short-term credit, or 
HCSTC, which is a more accurate description of this business given that it is the 
high cost of credit, rather than the length of the lending period and the occasion 
of repayment, that defines them. The 2008 financial crisis triggered a regulatory 
response that brought more stringent rules on traditional lending with a focus on 
creditworthiness rather than affordability. As a result, more credit consumers 
were pushed into the financial exclusion zone, due to lack of access to mainstream 
and relatively more affordable credit. This was not helped by the austerity 
measures brought by the government that increased financial hardship, which in 
turn increased demand for credit by the financially disadvantaged. 
Accordingly, high-cost credit became the only available option for these 
consumers. For instance, HCSTC lending increased from approximately £100 
million in 2004 to £1.9 billion in 2010, with a price tag that reached 4214% APR 
in November 2012.26 This is not to suggest that the other forms of high-cost credit 
such as catalogue credit, home-collected credit, and rent-to-own (RTO) no 
longer occupy their shares of the U.K. high-cost credit market. The Financial 
 
 20.  Sean O’Connell & Chris Reid, Working-Class Consumer Credit in the UK, 1925–60: The Role of 
the Check Trader, 58 ECON. HIST. REV. 378, 378 (2005). 
 21.  See generally MELANIE TEBBUTT, MAKING ENDS MEET: PAWNBROKING AND WORKING 
CLASS CREDIT 115–17 (1983) (providing further context to the prevalence of pawnbrokers and their 
impact on the working class); see also MARGOT C. FINN, THE CHARACTER OF CREDIT: PERSONAL 
DEBT IN ENGLISH CULTURE, 1740–1914, at 78 (2003) (describing the rise of pawnbroking in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century). 
 22. See AVRUM TAYLOR, WORKING CLASS CREDIT AND COMMUNITY SINCE 1918, at 58 (2002) 
(noting the decline of pawnbroking as a result of “city redevelopment” and “slum-clearance” programs). 
 23.  See O’Connell & Reid, supra note 20, at 380–84, 386 (describing the rise of check traders in the 
twentieth century). 
 24.  SEAN O’CONNELL, CREDIT AND COMMUNITY: WORKING CLASS DEBT IN THE UK SINCE 1880, 
at 185 (2009). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  NAT’L AUDIT OFF., REGULATING CONSUMER CREDIT, 2012-13, HC 685, at 15 (UK), https:// 
www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1213685.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AJF-MQBV]. APR 
calculation factors certain variants in the total cost of credit including the interest rate and other payable 
charges, however, it does not include default charges. See The Consumer Credit (Total Charges for 
Credit) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1011, Sched. (UK). 
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Conduct Authority (FCA) found that 700,000 people took out home-collected 
credit in 2016. At the end of 2016, 1.6 million people had outstanding home-
collected debt, with an overall value of £1.1 billion.27 As for catalogue credit, the 
total value outstanding of catalogue-credit debt at the end of 2016 was £4 billion, 
which is a significant increase on 2014 and 2015, despite the fact the over 700,000 
fewer people took out catalogue credit in 2016 than did in 2013.28 Finally, RTO is 
another type of high-cost credit that is worth mentioning although it has a smaller 
share of the high-cost credit market. In 2016, 200,000 people took RTO loans 
with a total value of £0.5 billion at the end of that year.29 
III 
DEVELOPING POLICIES AND EMERGING REGULATORY RESPONSES IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
This Part examines the development in the regulatory response to the 
changes charted earlier in the U.K. high-cost credit market. Two periods of time 
are particularly illuminative to examining this regulatory development: pre-2014 
and post-2014. 
A.  Pre-2014: Market Driven Minimum Regulations 
It has been suggested that, prior to 2014, neoliberalism strongly influenced 
the overall regulatory approach to consumer credit in general, and high-cost 
credit more specifically.30 Some of the clear signs of a neoliberal approach to 
regulating consumer credit can be traced back to the Crowther Committee’s 
work. Its report stated: 
[O]ur general view is that the state should interfere as little as possible with the 
consumer’s freedom to use his knowledge of consumer credit market to the best of his 
ability and according to his judgement of what constitutes his best interests . . . it remains 
a basic tenant of a free society that people themselves must be the judge of what 
contributes to their material welfare . . . the right policy is not to restrict [the consumers’] 
freedom of access [to credit] by administrative and legal measures but to help the 
minority who innocently get into trouble to manage their financial affairs more 
successfully.31 
In simple terms, this meant limited regulatory intervention in how the high-cost 
credit market operated. While acknowledging that some consumers can be 
harmed by this approach it insisted that the solution lay in improving consumers’ 
knowledge to make a better judgement.  
The manifestation of this approach is first seen in the CCA. The CCA’s 
abandonment of the statutory interest rate ceilings and focus on extortionate 
 
 27.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HIGH-COST CREDIT: FEEDBACK STATEMENT, 2017, FS17/2, at 38 (UK), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs17-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KFS-LM5A]. 
 28.  Id. at 41 (noting that 2.7 million people took out these products in 2013, compared to 1.9 million 
people in 2016). 
 29.  Id. at 34–35. 
 30.  Aldohni, supra note 5, at 326–27. 
 31.  Crowther, supra note 13, at 151. 
12_ALDOHNI_HIGH-COST CREDIT SECTOR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2021 1:13 PM 
No. 1 2021] CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE HIGH-COST CREDIT SECTOR 203 
credit bargains, later replaced with unfair relationships, gave parties greater 
latitude to set the terms of their agreement and gave courts more discretion to 
allow high-interest agreements.32 Up until 2014, consecutive governments headed 
by different parties acknowledged the presence of some major problems in the 
operation of the high-cost credit market in the United Kingdom yet made very 
little intervention. For example, the former Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), in a 2003 White Paper,33 expressed the government’s concerns about the 
protection of consumers on low incomes.34 However, the cost of the credit—the 
high interest rates charged—was not viewed as a source of concern.35 Further, 
despite identifying default charges as an area of concern,36 no meaningful 
intervention was made to address this problem. Instead, the DTI focused on the 
importance of making information transparent and clear, and ensuring that 
consumers had the ability to understand this information. The DTI report 
suggested that financial education and raising financial awareness played a 
greater role in providing consumer protection than other measures.37 In this 
regard, the Financial Services Market Act 2000 advanced this agenda through the 
creation of Money Advice Service.38 
Although financial awareness is an important aspect of consumer-credit 
protection, it is not the most effective means to protect consumers from the 
earlier identified problems as other concerning factors exist. It has been 
suggested that relying primarily on information in order to make consumers 
solely responsible for making their financial decisions is central to the neoliberal 
quest for market-driven regulations and the minimization of state intervention.39 
However, the concept of responsible credit consumers is based on a false 
conception that credit consumers are “wholly autonomous.”40 On the one hand, 
there are the well-identified behavioral biases that severely impact the assumed 
 
 32.  Despite being comprehensive in their coverage, the CCA2006 amendments do not acknowledge 
the link between unfairness and extortionate interest rates neither does the judiciary. For more 
discussion, see Aldohni, supra note 10, at 442–49. 
 33.  DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, FAIR, CLEAR AND COMPETITIVE: THE CONSUMER CREDIT 
MARKET IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 2003, Cm. 6040 (UK), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20070603164510/http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23663.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V9B-7NVB]. 
 34.  See id. at 52 (“Those who have financial problems or are on low incomes are especially 
vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation.”). 
 35.  Id. at 62. 
 36.  Id. at 53. 
 37.  See id. at 30–31 (“The Government, therefore, intends to introduce measures designed to ensure 
greater consistency and transparency in credit advertising, so that consumers . . . make informed 
purchasing decisions”); see also id. at 80–81. 
 38.  Financial Services and Marketing Act 2000, c. 8, § 6A (UK). The Money Advice Service was set 
up as “the consumer financial education body.” Financial Services Act 2010, c. 28, § 2(5) (UK). 
 39.  See David Harvey, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 73 (2005) (noting “investors should 
in principle be responsible for their own mistakes” under neoliberal theory). 
 40.  Toni Williams, Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education and the 
New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services, 29 LAW & POL’Y 231, 241–42 (2007). 
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autonomy.41 On the other hand, there is also the combination of the lack of 
options and the weak bargaining position of those who are financially excluded, 
more specifically the lack of access to affordable credit.42 
Further, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)—the former regulator of the U.K. 
consumer-credit market—in its 2010 Review of High Cost Credit,43 demonstrated 
the continuous lack of appetite to interfere in this segment of the consumer-credit 
market.44 The report took the view that any imposed price control would have 
adverse effects on consumers and the market despite many consultation 
respondents requesting a cap on the price of credit.45 Clearly, the government 
accepted the industry’s justification for charging an extortionately high interest 
rate and a variety of charges. This justification stemmed from the fundamental 
market mechanism of pricing, where higher credit risk would automatically 
justify higher interest rates. In this regard, the high-cost credit providers enjoyed 
high discretion in modeling credit risk and factoring it into their APR 
calculations. 
B.  Post-2014: Substantive Regulations 
In the period that preceded the transfer of the regulatory powers of the 
consumer-credit market to the FCA, more specifically from 2008 to 2012, 
consumer credit campaigners raised alarms with regard to the malpractices in the 
high-cost credit market, more specifically the HCSTC industry. They urged the 
regulator at the time, the OFT, to look into practices such as: lending without 
first adequately assessing the affordability of the credit or borrowers’ ability to 
repay, the inappropriate targeting of particular groups of people with clearly 
unsuitable or unaffordable credit, the practice of rolling over loans at the point 
of repayment so that charges escalate and the loans become unaffordable, and 
the unfair treatment of borrowers who get into financial difficulties.46 These 
malpractices were demonstrated by a survey conducted by the campaign group 
“Which?”47 showing that 45% of those who were surveyed and used HCSTC have 
 
 41.  See Geraint Howells, The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information, 32 
J.L. & SOC. 349, 360 (2005) (describing the biases which affect how consumers may engage with credit 
markets). 
 42.  For more detailed discussion, see generally Aldohni, supra note 10. 
 43.  OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, REVIEW OF HIGH-COST CREDIT: FINAL REPORT, 2010, OFT1232 
(U.K.). 
 44.  Id. at 4 (“We have found that, in a number of respects, these markets work reasonably well.”). 
 45.  See OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 12, at 24–25 (noting that the report believed market 
competition would remedy market issues better than a government cap); see also OFF. OF FAIR 
TRADING, supra note 43, at 4 (“We have considered the case for price controls for pawnbroking, payday 
loans, home credit and rent-to-buy credit and have concluded that they would not be an appropriate 
solution to the particular problems found in these high-cost credit markets.”). 
 46.  Press Release, Off. of Fair Trading, OFT Launches Review Into Payday Lending (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131101180011/http://oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2012/11-12 [https://perma.cc/B3YX-KU3N]. 
 47.  Which? is a charitable organization that campaigns to protect consumer rights, review products 
and offer independent advice. See Who we are, WHICH?, https://www.which.co.uk/about-which/who-we-
are [https://perma.cc/M4CJ-VY4V]. 
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rolled over their loans at least once and 57% were encouraged by HCSTC 
providers to take out further HCSTC.48 Further, the National Debtline published 
some figures that showed a significant increase in the received calls for help with 
payday loans in the first three months of 2012, which was 58% more than the 
previous quarter and 133% more than the same quarter in 2011.49 
In response, the OFT launched in February 2012 its investigation into the 
malpractices of HCSTC lenders.50 In March 2013 the OFT published its final 
report, Payday Lending Compliance Review: Final Report (OFT 2013 report). 
The report confirmed the abusive practices that riddled the industry and were 
highlighted by consumer campaign groups. More importantly, it described these 
malpractices as systemic rather than “confined to a few rogue traders.”51 The key 
identified problems included irresponsible lending and rolling over loans, which 
was associated with significant charges levied on the borrowers. The OFT review 
found evidence of insufficient assessment of creditworthiness and, more 
importantly, affordability by the majority of HCSTC providers.52 The OFT 2013 
report also found that irresponsible lenders not only allowed but encouraged 
rolling over loans, and in cases presented it as a feature of the loan.53 This earned 
them significant financial benefits as the report estimated that fifty percent of the 
sector’s revenue came from loans rolled over or refinanced.54 
The actual transfer of responsibilities to the FCA for the consumer-credit 
market, including high-cost credit, took place on April 1, 2014. This followed 
from the redesign of the regulatory architecture in 2013, which abolished the 
Financial Services Authority and replaced it with these two regulators. First, the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority at the Bank of England is in charge of 
prudential regulation and supervision and, second, the FCA is responsible for 
supervising the conduct of all of the retail and wholesale financial market 
participants and, more importantly for the purpose of this discussion, is also 
charged with the protection of their consumers.55 
 
 48.  New Which? Research exposes payday loan failings, WHICH? (May 18, 2012), http://www.which. 
co.uk/news/2012/05/new-which-research-exposes-payday-loan-failings-286258/ [https://perma.cc/HE9K-
Y5MU] (taking a survey of 3786 consumers, 301 of whom had taken out payday loans). 
 49.  Lisa Bachelor, Payday Loan Firms Agree to Voluntary Guidelines, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/may/24/payday-loan-firms-agree-voluntary-guidelines [https:// 
perma.cc/TG2R-HZB3] (4725 calls were received in the first three months of 2012). 
 50.  Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, supra note 46. 
 51.  OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, PAYDAY LENDING COMPLIANCE REVIEW: FINAL REPORT, 2013, 
OFT1481, at 3, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131213013305/http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ 
Credit/oft1481.pdf [https://perma.cc/383R-YR5C]. 
 52.  Id. at 12. 
 53.  Id. at 14–15. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY AND 
THE BANK OF ENGLAND, INCLUDING THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY, 2013, at 1, https:// 
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243451/9781
909096950.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK4Z-4J73]. 
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Many important preparatory measures took place before April 1, 2014 to 
ensure that the FCA not only has the mandate but also the powers required to 
effectively regulate this market. In this regard, the Financial Services Act 2012 
empowers the FCA to make rules regarding the cost of credit and duration of 
credit agreements.56 Further, the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 
amended the Financial Services Market Act 2000, placing a duty on the FCA to 
protect consumers against excessive charges, in other words, a duty to introduce 
a price cap where judged as necessary.57 Finally, the FCA expressed their broad 
vision for the consumer-credit market in a consultation paper entitled High-level 
Proposals for an FCA Regime for Consumer Credit in March 2013.58 This was 
followed in October 2013 by a more detailed and comprehensive consultation 
paper, Detailed Proposal for the FCA Regime for Consumer Credit.59 
In the October 2013 consultation paper, the FCA provided its detailed vision 
for the governance of the consumer-credit market in general. At the top of its 
agenda was HCSTC, where it dedicated a whole chapter to the governance of 
HCSTC market.60 The FCA also proposed a number of measures to address 
irresponsible lending without the required affordability checks and loan 
rollovers. This included capping debt rollover to two times, requiring risk 
warning on HCSTC financial promotions, and requiring HCSTC lenders to 
provide information on free debt advice before the point of rollover.61 The 
measures taken by the FCA, in relation to HCSTC and the wider high-cost credit 
products, indicate a shift towards a more “society and law” based approach.62 
This means that market forces in the high-cost credit market are not given 
priority over the interest of its participants. 
On July 1, 2014, the FCA limited the number of HSCTC rollovers to two and 
required that lenders give customers an information sheet designed to inform 
them about their rights and responsibilities and where they can get help.63 
Further, HCSTC providers are required to include a risk warning in any 
 
 56.  See Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, § 24 (UK) (substituting section 138–164 FSMA 2000 and 
inserting the FSMA 2000 s137C). 
 57.  See Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, c. 33, § 131 (U.K.) (amending section 137C 
of the Financial Services Market Act 2000). 
 58.  FIN. SERVS. AUTH., HIGH-LEVEL PROPOSALS FOR AN FCA REGIME FOR CONSUMER CREDIT, 
2013, Cm. 13/7, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/fsa-cp13-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3UV-
MDNS]. 
 59.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 4. 
 60.  Id. at 52. 
 61.  Id. at 9. 
 62.  The FSA and its “principle based approach” had a more neoliberal regulatory ethos. FIN. SERVS. 
AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, 2009, 
available at http://www.actuaries.org/CTTEES_TFRISKCRISIS/Documents/turner_review.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/K4V9-D4WH].; see also Aldohni, supra note 5, at 321. 
 63.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 6.7.23 R. Regarding the requirement of 
information sheet, see, for example, Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39 (UK); FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., 
DETAILED RULES FOR THE FCA REGIME FOR CONSUMER CREDIT INCLUDING FEEDBACK ON FCA 
QCP 13/18 AND ‘MADE RULES,’ 2014, Cm. 14/3, at 66, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps14-
03.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SPV-D3BW]. 
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communication of financial promotion and how to get debt advice.64 In order to 
ensure that HCSTC consumers are getting the best deal, Price Comparison 
Websites (PCWs) are required to allow users to search by amount and duration 
of the loan and must present their ranking of HCSTC products on the basis of 
price only, unaffected by any commercial interests or relationship that the PCW 
has.65 The FCA also required HCSTC providers to explain to consumers the 
Continuous Payment Authority, which allows HCSTC providers to take payment 
directly from a customer’s debit or credit card whenever they consider 
themselves owed.66 
As for the affordability assessment, the FCA developed its rules—in its 
Consumer Credit Sourcebook, Chapter 5 (CONC 5)—to apply to all regulated 
credit agreements including the high-cost credit ones.67 The key feature of these 
rules is that they are not only concerned with the risk of default but they also 
consider the credit affordability for the customer. Therefore, it is not entirely 
centered around the interests of the lender. To this end, the high-cost credit 
provider must consider, among a host of issues, “any other potential adverse 
consequences for the customer arising under the agreement from a failure to 
make a repayment by the due date.”68 The CONC 5 includes other provisions 
designed to safeguard the effectiveness of the creditworthiness and affordability 
assessment.69 
Refinancing seems to be a recurring problem in the high-cost credit market, 
particularly in home-collected credit and HCSTC. In relation to the former, the 
FCA set clear guidance on their expectation with regard to the implementation 
of section 49 of the CCA. It makes it a criminal offence for home-collected credit 
firms to offer new loans or refinancing during home visits without a previous 
specific written and signed request.70 Further, the FCA requires home-collected 
credit firms to design their agent incentive schemes in the way that manages the 
risk of consumer harm.71 As for HCSTC, the FCA provides rules that require 
 
 64.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 3.4.1R. 
 65.  Id. at CONC 2.5A.2R, CONC 5.2A.20R. 
 66.  Id. at CONC 4.6.2R, CONC 7.6.13R. 
 67.  Id. at CONC 5R. 
 68.  Id. at CONC 5.2A.21R(3-k). 
 69.  For instance, CONC 5.2A.36R states that: “A firm must not accept an application for credit 
under a regulated credit agreement where the firm knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the 
customer has not been truthful in completing the application in relation to information relevant to the 
creditworthiness assessment.” Id. at CONC 5.2A.36R. Further, CONC 5.2A.33 R requires firms to 
“establish, implement and maintain clear and effective policies and procedures” in relation to 
creditworthiness/affordability assessments. Id. at CONC 5.2A.33 R. 
 70.  Id. at CONC 3.10.3G; see also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HIGH-COST CREDIT REVIEW: FEEDBACK 
ON CP18/12 WITH FINAL RULES AND GUIDANCE AND CONSULTATION ON BUY NOW PAY LATER 
OFFERS, 2018, Cm. 18/43, at 16, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp18-43.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/QFZ6-82MY] (stating failure to comply is a criminal offense). 
 71.  Id. at 17. See also FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., NO INCENTIVES, REMUNERATION AND 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN CONSUMER CREDIT, 2018, Cm. FG 18/2, at 24, https://www.fca.org.uk/ 
publication/finalised-guidance/fg18-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR9X-H4N3] (suggesting ways to mitigate 
risks of consumer harm). 
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HCSTC providers, before entering into a new HCSTC agreement, to send the 
information sheet that warns the consumer about the risk and liabilities and 
include information about debt advice.72 The FCA explains that HCSTC 
providers should not refinance where it is unsustainable or otherwise harmful to 
the consumer,73 and in any case, HCSTC providers may only refinance two times, 
unless exercising forbearance.74 
Moreover, the FCA makes it clear that HCSTC lenders should not allow a 
customer to enter into consecutive agreements where cumulatively the total 
amount paid by the customer is unsustainable.75 In this regard, the FCA 
addressed the issue of credit limit increase in catalogue credit, where the FCA 
extended its credit card rules to catalogue credit.76 This means that catalogue-
credit providers cannot increase or offer to increase the credit limit where they 
have been advised that the customer does not want the increase.77 This shows the 
FCA’s general concern with the sustainability of debt in the context of high-cost 
credit in general. 
While the FCA refused to introduce a price cap on home-collected credit 
citing the lack of evidence to support such strong intervention,78 it implemented 
a price cap on two types of high-cost credit, namely HCSTC and RTO. As for the 
HCSTC, the FCA’s price cap came into effect in January 2015. It is designed to 
deal with three main sources of concern in the HCSTC market, namely, interest, 
fees and charges, and default charges.79 In this respect, the cap applies to various 
types of interest and charges which include, but are not limited to, interest on 
credit, late payments or default charges, transmission charges, early repayments, 
refinancing or termination charges, credit broker’s charges when the broker is in 
the same group as the lender or the credit broker agreed to share the charge with 
the lender, ancillary services charges, and interest on any of the mentioned 
charges.80 The cap also applies to any charges under connected agreements,81 and 
it provides an outright prohibition of compound interest.82 
 
 72.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 6.7.20 R. 
 73.  Id. at CONC 6.7.21 G. 
 74.  Id. at CONC 6.7.23 R. See also id. at CONC 7.3.4 R (stating that “forbearance and due 
consideration” must be exercised by the firm in the case of arrears or default). 
 75.  Id. at CONC 6.7.22G. 
 76.  Id. at CONC 6.7.4 R–6.7.13 R (regulating “[c]redit card and retail revolving credit 
requirements.”). 
 77.  Id. at CONC 6.7.7 R. 
 78.  Id. at 17. 
 79.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DETAILED RULES FOR THE PRICE CAP ON HIGH-COST SHORT-TERM 
CREDIT INCLUDING FEEDBACK ON CP14/10 AND FINAL RULES, 2014, PS14/16, at 6, http://www.fc 
a.org.uk/your-fca/documents/policy-statements/ps14-16 [https://perma.cc/42S4-FB87]. 
 80.  Ancillary services “include, but are not limited to, services related to processing the application 
and to the transmission of the money being lent, and insurance or insurance-like services ancillary to the 
agreement.” FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5A.2.18 R, 5A.3.22 R, 5A.4.18 R, 5A.1.6 G. 
 81.  Id. at CONC 5A.4 16 R. 
 82.  Id. at CONC 5A.2.19 R, 5A.3.24 R, 5A.4.19R. 
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The first layer of the cap, the initial price cap, covers interest rates and fees 
and charges—excluding default charges subject to default caps—as HCSTC 
providers cannot now charge more in interest and fees than 0.8% per day of the 
amount borrowed.83 The second layer targets default charges as it restricts the 
amount paid in default to a total of £15, whether the debt is being repaid in 
installments or in a single payment.84 This means that HCSTC providers cannot 
charge £15 for each instance of default when borrowers are paying back by 
installments.85 The third layer is a total cost cap where a borrower should never 
pay more in interest, fees, and charges than 100% of the amount borrowed.86 
With regard to RTO, the FCA found convincing evidence to cap the price of 
credit paid by consumers. Central to the FCA’s decision are: first, the fact that 
most RTO consumers would fall within the financially excluded group, and 
second, the extortionate price paid by RTO consumers which in some cases is 
four times the retail price of the same goods.87 On April 1, 2019, the FCA 
introduced its RTO multi-layered price cap. First, the FCA imposed a total cost 
of credit cap of 100%, in other words, the interest charges are not allowed to 
exceed the cash price of the goods.88 Second, RTO firms must benchmark base 
prices—including the price of delivery and installation—against the prices 
charged by three mainstream retailers.89 Finally, firms are prohibited from 
increasing the prices of any goods and services related to RTO agreements as a 
way to recover revenue lost due to the total cost of credit cap. 
Undoubtedly, the level of intervention demonstrated above has redefined the 
relationship between the regulator and the high-cost credit market. The regulator 
no longer shies away from interfering directly in favor of consumers who, due to 
their disadvantaged financial position, do not have strong bargaining powers. 
However, there are some areas of concern with which the FCA still needs to keep 
up. 
 
 83.  Id. at CONC 5A.2.3 R, 5A.3.3 R, 5A.4.3 R. See also FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra 
note 71, at 6. 
 84.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 79, at 35. 
 85.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5A.2.14R, 5A.3.18R, 5A.4.14R; see also FIN. 
CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 79, at 10 (stating the cap on default charges is £15). 
 86.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5A.2.2R, 5A.3.2R. See also FIN. CONDUCT 
AUTH., supra note 79, at 8 (stating a “100% price cap” provides the “least onerous way to achieve the 
necessary level of protection for consumers”). 
 87.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., RENT-TO-OWN PRICE CAP-FEEDBACK ON CP18/35 AND FINAL RULES, 
2019, Cm. PS19/6, at 10, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VB4-
X9AR]; see also 
Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., FCA Confirms Introduction of Rent-to-Own Price Cap (Mar. 5, 
2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-confirms-introduction-rent-own-price-cap [https:// 
perma.cc/C6L5-C2CS]. 
 88.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 6, at CONC 5B.2.11R. 
 89.  Id. at CONC 5B.2.2R. 
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IV 
THE SHORTFALLS AND ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Problems remain in the context of high-cost credit that the regulator and the 
government should respond to in a timely manner in order to ensure the 
continuous protection of consumers. These problems arise largely from two main 
areas: the adaptive and evolving nature of the high-cost credit business model 
and the credit supply vulnerability dilemma. 
A.  Adaptive and Evolving Industry 
As demonstrated earlier, HCSTC is one of the main segments of the high-
cost credit market that received significant regulatory attention and experienced 
the highest level of intervention by the regulator. Despite all the regulatory 
efforts, however, evidence suggests that HCSTC remains a major source of over-
indebtedness in the United Kingdom90 HCSTC providers have moved to 
installment loans. Instead of requiring a single payment after thirty days, the 
loans are now repayable typically over three to four months.91 Although this may 
explain the decrease in default rates,92 it also explains the rise in arrears rates.93 
With the new structure there is higher risk of missing an installment, and the cost 
of borrowing is increased due to the longer term of the loan.94 Further, the use of 
online platforms and digital technology has widened the group of users of this 
type of credit and brought in the younger generation, increasing their risk of over-
indebtedness.95 
Offering HCSTC online also exacerbates the behavioral biases associated 
with this type of borrowing,96 as there is neither human interaction nor time for 
reflection. Therefore, it can be suggested that the FCA should consider ways to 
influence the consumers’ attitude towards HCSTC in order to minimize their 
 
 90.  Consumer Credit: High-Cost Short-Term Credit Lending Data, FINANCIAL CONDUCT 
AUTHORITY (May 15, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/data/consumer-credit-high-cost-short-term-credit-
lending-data-jan-2019 [https://perma.cc/GAH9-TFAS] (noting that users’ HCSTC loans are much more 
likely to be over-indebted than the average person). 
 91.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 27 at 24; see also STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, PAYDAY 
LOANS: THE NEXT GENERATION 9 (2017), https://www.stepchange.org/portals/0/documents/ 
reports/payday-loans-next-generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NVJ-GKSE] (showing most clients have 3–
4 repayment plans). 
 92.  STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, supra note 91, at 9; see also CITIZENS ADVICE, FCA HIGH-
COST CREDIT CALL FOR INPUT: CITIZEN ADVICE RESPONSE 2 (2017), https://www.citizens 
advice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/Debt%20and%20Money%20Publications/Citizens%20Advice%2
0-%20HCSTC.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8LG-GBPS]. 
 93.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 27, at 14–15, 23–24. 
 94.  Id. at 14. 
 95.  The FCA has reported that 49.8% of HCSTC consumers are aged 18–34 (16.4% aged 18–24 and 
33.4% aged 25–34). See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HIGH-COST SHORT-TERM CREDIT LENDING DATA 
(May 15, 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/data/consumer-credit-high-cost-short-term-credit-lending-data-
jan-2019 [https://perma.cc/VAJ2-DUWT]. 
 96.  SHARON WORTON, IAM SPARHAM, SAM GREW, ANDREW SHAW, KATIE WISE & ANN 
YEATMAN, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, USAGE AND EXPERIENCE OF HIGH COST CREDIT: 
CONSUMER RESEARCH REPORT 9–12 (2018). 
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exposure to these risks and eventually enhance consumer protection. In its 
October 2013 consultation, the FCA referred to the need to conduct more 
behavioral research into ways to nudge credit consumers to make better 
choices.97 Since then, the FCA has published a number of papers exploring the 
use of behavioral economics in the credit market.98 The most recent one explored 
the use of nudges regarding credit card debt and found “the semblance of 
success.”99 In this regard, the FCA needs to further explore this avenue for 
intervention in the context of HCSTC and its wider use in other high-cost credit 
products. 
B.  The Credit Supply Vulnerability Dilemma 
The term vulnerable is often utilized in the literature to describe high-cost 
credit consumers. The primary use of the term, in this context, is to denote the 
disadvantaged social and economic status of those consumers. In this regard, 
vulnerability can be viewed from two perspectives.100 First, information 
vulnerability which concerns high-cost credit consumers’ ability not only to access 
the required credit information but also to assess and understand it. Second, 
supply vulnerability that is connected to their access to credit sources, more 
specifically affordable credit.101 It is the latter that poses the most significant 
challenge at the moment with the loss of jobs and the rise of unemployment 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The availability of alternative credit sources, more specifically accessible and 
affordable credit, is central to the protection of the financially disadvantaged and 
to the achievement of financial inclusion. Yet, the financially vulnerable are the 
consumers most affected by the stringency of micro-prudential regulations. Since 
the financial crisis of 2008, prudential regulation has become a cornerstone of the 
worldwide regulatory response. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England, 
through the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Policy 
 
 97.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 4, at 78. 
 98. See, e.g., KRISTINE ERTA, STEFAN HUNT, ZANNA ISCENKO, WILL BRAMBLEY, APPLYING 
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AT THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (FCA Occasional Paper No. 1, 
2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YNE2-UJMB]; FIN. ADVICE WORKING GRP., HM TREASURY & THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT 
AUTHORITY, RULES OF THUMB AND NUDGES: IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF UK 
CONSUMERS (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/fawg-rules-of-thumb-nudges.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J4NU-RHQL]; PAUL ADAMS & LAURA SMART, FROM ADVERT TO ACTION: 
BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHT INTO THE ADVERTISING OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS (FCA Occasional Paper 
No. 26, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/op17-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
73XU-NYVS]. 
 99.  PAUL ADAMS, BENEDICT GUTTMAN-KENNEY, LUCY HAYES, STEFAN HUNT, DAVID 
LAIBSON & NEIL STEWART, THE SEMBLANCE OF SUCCESS IN NUDGING CONSUMERS TO PAY DOWN 
CREDIT CARD CEBT (FCA Occasional Paper No. 45, 2018). 
 100. Aldohni, supra note 10, at 421. 
 101.  Id. at 446–47. 
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Committee, oversees the micro and macro aspects of prudential regulation.102 
While prudential regulation is a complicated subject, for the purpose of this 
discussion, micro-prudential regulation means simply that mainstream credit 
providers—for example banks and building societies—are now very restricted in 
terms of the risks they can take in their operations, and further all risk must be 
accounted for and encountered in their capital buffers.103 This clearly applies to 
their retail lending, where financially disadvantaged consumers do not measure 
well on a creditworthiness assessment.104 Therefore, because these consumers 
pose credit default risks, among other risks—which should be avoided at all costs 
under micro-prudential regulations—mainstream credit providers have largely 
stopped supplying credit to these consumers. 
Although the FCA has been recently looking into the credit supply issue and 
exploring the options, it does not seem to be focusing on a centralized solution. 
Instead, the FCA is focusing on the regional level by reviewing the role of credit 
unions, local charities, and local authorities or councils in supplying funds.105 
However, some of these options have limited financial capacity and are not 
capable of dealing with the existing high demand. For, example, the cuts to the 
local councils’ funding since 2008 have adversely affected these councils’ ability 
to create emergency funding schemes for individuals as they are struggling to 
fund their essential services.106 Further, not all those who are financially excluded 
would qualify to use these sources. Take for instance credit unions. They are 
membership-based and the legislative cap of three percent interest rate per 
month may prevent them from extending credit to higher risk consumers.107 
This is not to suggest that social finance in the broad sense of this term does 
not have a role to play in addressing the lack of affordable credit problem. The 
forms of sources encompassed by social finance, such as cooperative finance, 
 
 102.  What is the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)?, BANK OF ENGLAND, https://www.bankof 
england.co.uk/knowledgebank/what-is-the-prudential-regulation-authority-pra [https://perma.cc/A3C8-
9DTY]. 
 103.  For more detailed explanation of capital adequacy and micro-prudential regulation, see IRIS 
CHIU & JOANNA WILSON, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 329 (2018). 
 104.  See Becky Rowe, et al., MIND THE GAP 49 (2015) (discussing how some financially 
disadvantaged consumers lack understanding of credit scores and how to improve them); see also FIN. 
CONDUCT AUTH., CONSUMER CREDIT AND CONSUMERS IN VULNERABLE CIRCUMSTANCES 25 (2014) 
(noting credit score can restrict consumers’ access to credit); see also SHARRON WORTON, ET AL., 
CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH: LOW INCOME CONSUMERS 36 (2014), https://www.fca.org.uk/pub 
lication/research/optimisa-research-low-income-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/37UL-FNVD] (addressing 
factors which influence certain consumers’ willingness to pursue credit). 
 105.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH-COST CREDIT REPORT, at 5, 12–13 (2019), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/alternatives-high-cost-credit-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P 
VH-ECAU]. 
 106.  It has been estimated by Unison that £10 billion is needed for councils funding in England in 
order to carry out their social care and environmental services otherwise there will cut to child and adult 
cares services and environmental services. See Press Release, Unison, Ministers Must Fix Council 
Funding to Avoid “Catastrophic Cuts”, (July 6, 2020), https://www.unison.org.uk/news/press-
release/2020/07/ministers-must-fix-council-funding-avoid-%E2%80%8Bcatastrophic-cuts/ [https://perm 
a.cc/7BW7-K5JE]. 
 107.  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 105 at 9–10. 
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social banks, and crowd funding, empower individuals as they try to carry out 
market-based activities while delivering on important social objectives.108 
However, they are restricted in terms of their resources, and when operating in 
the form of mainstream credit providers they are subject to the same regulatory 
constraints discussed earlier. The United Kingdom needs a more comprehensive 
solution to increase the supply of credit available to financially disadvantaged 
consumers. Meanwhile the United Kingdom also needs to further ensure that 
those who are still relying on high-cost credit are not subjected to extortionate 
costs and practices. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The challenge posed by the high-cost credit sector in the United Kingdom is 
multi-dimensional, therefore, a multi layered solution is needed. The vulnerable 
nature of this sector’s consumers adds more pressure on the regulator to act 
quickly and effectively. 
Central to this solution is a tailored national scheme designed specifically to 
deal with the issue of accessibility of affordable credit by the financially excluded. 
This scheme can be entirely funded by the government or by a collaboration 
between the government and the banking sector.109 Clearly this is a matter that 
requires far more detailed research in order to strike the right balance between 
the public and private interaction. 
In the meantime, a key factor for this to succeed is ensuring that the 
consumer-credit regulations are capable of protecting the most vulnerable who 
turn to high-cost credit while this arrangement is being figured out. This means 
keeping the current regulations under continuous review in order to respond to 
any evolution in the business model of the high-cost credit providers designed to 
circumvent these rules. 
Moreover, the FCA needs to further explore the role that behavioral finance 
can play in the context of high-cost credit products. The FCA should investigate 
how the decision-making mechanisms of high-cost credit consumers can be aided 
to improve their borrowing decisions. The FCA needs to further examine 
whether this can be achieved by a simple nudge or a more complicated behavioral 
intervention is required. 
 
 108.  Othmar M. Lehner & Alex Nicholls, Social Finance and Crowdfunding for Social Enterprises: A 
Public–Private Case Study Providing Legitimacy and Leverage, 16 VENTURE CAP. 271 (2014). 
 109. STEPCHANGE DEBT CHARITY, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
